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Youth and Information Technology: An Indonesian Case Study of Indonesian Millennials' Views on U.S. Election

Suzie S. Sudarman

University of Indonesia, Gedung Rektor Tingkat 4, Jakarta 10430, Indonesia

suziesudarman@yahoo.com

Abstract

At the moment the situation among Indonesian youth depicts how the so-called Indonesian demographic bonus can constitute as constraint or as enabler to the formation of new leaders in Indonesia. At this juncture of my research up to the beginning of 2017 Indonesian youth seems to have negative perceptions of domestic and international politics. When tested on their views on U.S. election most of the millennials in Jabodetabek 67% thought that election fraud as normal. Technological advances have led to a dramatic reduction in the cost of processing and transmitting information. The result is an explosion of Information that has produced a paradox “of plenty” and in need of cue-givers. Attention, rather than information, becomes the scarce resource, and those who can distinguish valuable information from background clutter gain power. When good quality Information are shared and when these generated interactions, the process would enable the creation of meanings within a trust community.

Keywords: Indonesian millennials, good quality information, trust community, cue-givers

Abstrak

Di saat ini situasi dikalangan pemuda Indonesia menggambarkan bahwa bonus demografi Indonesia bisa menjadi baik hambatan maupun penentu susunan pemimpin baru di Indonesia. Di saat pencapaian riset saya ini hingga awal tahun 2017 pemuda Indonesia tampaknya punya persepsi politik domestik dan internasional. Ketika di tanya pandangan mereka soal pemilihan umum di Amerika Serikat 67% kalangan millennials berfikir bahwa penipuan dalam pemilihan umum itu wajar. Kemajuan teknologi telah mengarah kepada reduksi dramatis dari harga memproses dan mentransmisi informasi. Hasilnya adalah sebuah peledakan informasi yang telah mewujudkan sebuah paradoks “keberlebihan” dan sangat dibutuhkannya pemberi petunjuk. Perhatian bukannya informasi, menjadi barang langka, dan mereka yang bisa membedakan antara informasi yang berharga dan kebisingan di latar belakang bisa berpengaruh. Apabila informasi yang baik bisa dibagi dan apabila hal ini menumbuhkan interaksi, prosesnya mampu menciptakan bermacam-macam makna di sebuah komunitas yang dapat dipercaya (trust community)

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Introduction

It is my contention in my presentation that in the Indonesian context we first of all need to discuss how the conflation of nation and state occurred: Anderson stated that the imagined community finds the gauge of its autonomy in a

state. And, vice versa the state finds in the nation its modern legitimation (Anderson, 1983). Implicit in Anderson's narrative is that industrial capitalism helps create nationalism, which was at the same time a response to global imperialism (Anderson, 1998). Ironically

however, as the classical nation-state project was coming fully into its own; advancing capitalism was beginning to sap its foundations (Anderson, 1998).

In looking at the Indonesian democratic reforms I propose to present a more nuanced reality that “the boundary between state and society is ‘blurred’”(van Klinken and Barker, 2009). According to van Klinken and Barker, they have adopted Joel Migdal’s phrase “state-in-society,” and that the state’s social embeddedness has patron-client features; the social bases in which the state is embedded are quite wide, but the state as a network is not embedded in all places and social formations,”(van Klinken and Barker, 2009).

By focusing on the process of democratic reforms I intend to illustrate that the elite never finds it easy to stay on top, class and popular democratic struggles have contradictory effect (van Klinken and Barker, 2009). Over the long run government can try to shape national identity, but ultimately the people interpret what it means to be a citizen. As technology improves, government needs to keep up with citizens rising expectations. The better connected the nation is, the better informed the citizens will be about the world. And it seems obvious that suppressing information and ideas is possible but requires continuous effort. The provision of civic spaces, both in cyber and urban spaces were important elements of the democratization processes in Indonesia (Lim, 2007).

Literature Review

The transnational network society (Castells, 2000), specifically the idea of the weakening of the nation-state, needs a more contextualized, empirically grounded, and culturally sensitive analysis. Different historic-cultural, ethnic backgrounds and emotional perceptions can severely impact any negotiating process or more specifically, histories of nationalism and internal politics can lead to a sense of stubbornness and rigidity against global integration. By contrast, the pursuit of

cooperation on a particular functional issue can greatly assist in the creation of a momentum for national identity to be placed in a broader political process, as there will be a clearer understanding of the potential gains that may accrue.

Franke Wilmer in her work on indigenous people and marginal sites in the changing context of world politics, discusses the development and modernization agendas underlying the social transformations occurring throughout the world (Wilmer, 1996). I shall attempt to add to her observation based on the Indonesian experience. What is evident is not only that the presumed superiority of industrial economies and the bureaucratic systems that is necessary to manage them denigrate and undermine the cultural integrity and viability of indigenous peoples, but that there are extra state localized popular resistances that have been part of the Indonesian tapestry for the longest of time, which merit illumination. Prior to independence a common vision of a free nation was what linked these myriad resistance movements together (Anderson, 1983).

The state was weak from the very beginning. It was penetrated by society; people “joined” the state but then fundamental loyalties were typically to nation, ideological grouping, paramilitary organization, and local community. The penetration of the state continued via the political parties. As many of the traditional collaborationist upper classes in parts of the outer island lost many of their power and wealth, they were eager to protect their lineages’ futures by sending their children into the civil service academies. They in turn added the energetically conservative and particularistic “ethnic” dimension to the kaleidoscopic inner life of the state. The army and Sukarno came to the “rescue” of the state (Anderson, 1983).

The price of the alliance with military leaders was the possibility of a successful coup and the installation of a military dominated regime. First, Sukarno began to encourage a remobilization of extra state popular

organization, the result of which was that each political party was the core of a huge, organized, ideological family about 20 million strong, which competed fiercely for influence in every sphere of life and on a round-the clock basis. Hence the extra state popular movement penetration of the state resumed (Anderson, 1983).

Second, there was also an increasing emphasis on economic autarchy, and an actively anti imperialist foreign policy. It was also aimed at decreasing the leverage of the United States in Indonesian domestic politics. Sukarno's strategy was unsustainable as Indonesia was too poor. The only institution capable of sustaining itself was the army because it was "legally" closed to party penetration and it controlled the bulk of the country's assets (Anderson, 1983). The anti communist massacres of 1965-1966 under the direction of the army leadership gave birth to the New Order, or in Ben Anderson's parlance, the resurrection of the state and its triumph vis-à-vis society and nation (Anderson, 1983).

Anderson argued that the amalgam "nation-state," is rather recent and that often it conjures a popular participatory nation with our older adversarial state. The behavior of the amalgam varies in character according to the predominance of any one of its components (Anderson, 1983).

As states disintegrate, the concomitant refugee problems, democratic revolutions, and global transitions have again thrust debates the issues of electronic space and power in general, Saskia Sassen seems quite prescient when she emphasizes the need to re-theorize electronic space due to the incipient stage for contestation (Sassen, 1998). For one thing, its attributes engender the notion of distributed power yet, it also makes possible other forms of power, such as financial markets. She imagines that a contest will occur between powerful corporate actors strengthening the role of private electronic space and fairly broad-based civil society in electronic space (Sassen, 1998). Oftentimes social media users' exposure to

information is driven by algorithms that present information based on personal interests. This can easily isolate users from other view points or content which Lim termed as filter bubble (Lim, 2017) leads to problems in national security and military affairs.

The above seems particularly relevant now that the non-Western world contributes to an unprecedented degree to the power dynamics and institutional developments underlying the evolution of global politics. There seems to be a need for a greater awareness of the non-Western experience of international politics and of how it will affect global affairs. In the Asian Survey (2002) journal special edition on the "Legacy of Violence in Indonesia" other authors attributed violence to Indonesia's past and culture (Dittmer: 541-544; Cribb: 550-563; Zurbuchen: 564-581; Collins: 582-604; Stoler: 642-650).

In Indonesia there has always been a historical ambiguity between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' uses of violence in civil society that can be traced back to the colonial period (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). The New Order regime used violence as a central strategy for maintaining political control; violence and criminality were once normalized as state practice (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). After the fall of the regime, non-state groups employing violence and intimidation as a political, social, and economic strategy have emerged (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). They operate like criminal gangs, and articulate ideologies that legitimize the use of force, violence, and coercion through appeals to ethnicity (*FBR – Forum Betawi Rempug*), class (like *Pemuda Pancasila*), and religious affiliation (like *FPI – Front Pembela Islam*). Violence is also justified as an act of rectification in a situation where the state is absent in the provision of security, justice and employment (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). With the growing number of affluent Indonesians, while there is inequality, Indonesia has become a fertile ground for social conflicts, which can easily manifest into violent actions (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012).

At present, as President Jokowi's position firmly consolidated the remaining opposition forces felt that they needed to develop strategies to block his plan for reelection (Mietzner, 2017). The localization of the Internet brings three consequences: first of all the rise of civil society and the push for political reform; secondly, the creation of physical and cyber-civic spaces for the practices of civil society; and thirdly, the formation of and struggles over identity (Lim, 2002). In the 2017 Pilkada case in Jakarta social space fragmented into enclaves that are based on a perceived shared identity (Lim, 2017). Lim named this a digital version of tribal nationalism (Lim, 2017). Social media facilitates freedom of expression and the practice of sectarian and racist acts (Lim, 2017).

In order to mitigate some of the bad effect of change that comprises of conflicting trends and actors, the amplification of animosity and intolerance through out the nation, Indonesia may consider encouraging the fostering of trust communities among those interested in a particular activity. It will be evident that technology will enable trust communities to trade in information and ideas among its members. This is an aspect of trust communities that can be relevant to Indonesia. The building of trust enables people to constantly cooperate (Wu, 2015). A trust community is essentially a network and a community, and some institutions may actually be trust communities, especially if they are communication technology enabled (Wu, 2015).

The intriguing question then would be just how these circumstances can come about. To understand the seemingly contrasting perspectives, we have to attempt to focus on a specific cooperative effort when mutual interests can evolve in specific functional issues, particularly with regard to Indonesians, paraphrasing Swidler (Swidler, 1986), people, or more specifically Indonesians, do not build lines of action from scratch and culture

influences action through the shape and organizations of those links (Swidler, 1986). It is true that during unsettled periods, explicit ideologies may directly govern action and thus prevent Indonesians to reshape their repertoire, or "tool kit:" habits, skills, and styles from which people construct "strategies of action" in a more natural way (Swidler, 1986). Moreover, modern technology may reinforce and at the same time threaten the project of the nation-state that will contribute to the difficulties of the process of negotiation between local particulars and the global cultural flows.

Through the invigoration of social groups or trust communities we can begin to create a particular focus on areas that can be made to strengthen the social glue that can further create a sense of 'belonging' that is entailed in the membership component of citizenship and that is inadequately captured by contract theories. This also needs attention particularly due to the evident inclinations of the Indonesian millennials as has been investigated by the Yayasan INADIS research.

Result and Discussion

1. Indonesia's Social Transformation

We need to first look at history since Indonesia's democratic reforms in 1998. The processes of democratization gave rise to claims by various ethnic identities, and traditional authority which compete with the articulation of claims in the name of Islam (Sidel, 2006). Aside from this the process of urbanization and the expansion of educational opportunities, and the emergence and spread of new communication technology in countries populated by Muslim countries facilitated the objectification and functionalization of the faith by the public and help caused the decline of the Islamist project (Sidel, 2006). John Sidel also views that terrorism in Indonesia has been shaped not only by Islam, but also by the variegated forms and forces of Christianity, capitalism, and nationalism (Sidel, 2003).

Still, there was the issue of poverty in Indonesia; there is an increase to 18%, or up

four million to almost 40 million people. Indonesia continued to reduce its external debt-to-GDP ratio, bringing it down to 40% and completed repayment of loans from the International Monetary Fund undertaken through the Extended Fund Facility for the economic crisis. As Indonesia approached 2007 it looked more stable and President Yudhoyono in his Independence Day celebration address highlighted Pancasila as the solution to Indonesia's diversity and fragility as it was currently entangled by problems due to the state's unclear sense of unity and purpose (Sidel, 2006).

In 2008 developments in Indonesia were marked by sharp fluctuations in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's popularity though he remained the favorite for the 2009 election for his handling of the Indonesian economy (Mietzner, 2009). The official figures indicated that the number of poor Indonesian declined from 37.17 million in March 2007 to 34.96 million (or 15.4% of the population) by March 2008. Indonesia has a relatively high inflation due to the 26% increase in the case of rice and the explosion of international oil price in the first half of 2008 (Mietzner, 2009).

Indonesia reelected Yudhoyono for managing the global financial crisis and maintaining the solidity of the polity (Mietzner, 2010). The election highlighted major development (Mietzner, 2010). First, the introduction of a parliamentary threshold of 2.5%, reduced the number of political parties from 17 to nine, consolidating the party system and erecting hurdles to the creation of new parties in the future. Second, the disposition of Islamic parties eroded further from 38.1% in 2004 to 27.8% in 2009 which pointed to the strengthening of political centrism. Third, the emergence of Yudhoyono's *Partai Demokrat*, as the largest party replacing *Golkar*.

In 2010 Indonesian institutions have proven strong and resilient, but the agenda of political reform faced serious setbacks (Kimura, 2011). Indonesian economy made a strong showing, the poverty rate in Indonesia fell from 14.1% in

2009 to 13.3% in 2010, a notable achievement but there are still 32 million people living below the poverty line (Kimura, 2011).

Corruption, political infighting, and increased sectarian tension continued to dominate Indonesia in 2011. Religious violence ticked upward and took new forms. (Kimura, 2012). The role of Islam seems to evolve further. On the one hand, Islamic political parties are losing popularity and have ceded ground to the more secular parties in power. On the other hand, sectarian violence and religiously motivated violence and conflict have been on the rise (Kimura, 2012).

Geoffrey C. Gunn argued that in 2012 a debate on Indonesia's future turned on the tension between sustained economic growth fuelled by demand for Indonesia's natural resources and the highly skewed distribution of wealth (Gunn, 2013). Outbursts of state and nonstate violence continued in 2013 (Gunn, 2014). In 2014 Indonesia elected Jokowi as president raising public expectations for reform (Hamayotsu, 2015), but anti minority religious violence and intolerance continue to become problems besetting Indonesia's political landscape (Hamayotsu, 2015). Jakarta election in fact became a proxy war between Jokowi and his former rival (Mietzner, 2017). The depth of conflict was graphically illustrated by Evgeny Morozov views that: "connectivity does not equal democratization—digital technologies have different effects in different contexts (Leopold, 2013)." If, for instance, communication among people becomes quicker and easier, like in a network society, it can grow stronger, the production of social meaning will be instantaneous, and any government will have difficulties in responding to the demands to change their laws and regulations.

2. Can Trust Communities Be Forged in Indonesia?

In Indonesia, those placed in the intermediate social strata between the elites and masses or the organized groups active in public affairs, may pursue ends that place group

loyalty above individual achievement because the social skills necessary for a drastically new orientation will require cultural retooling that may be costly (Hamayotsu, 2015). Such organized groups represent social forces that may constitute the elements of what make Indonesia a potential trouble spot. For example, ethnic origin, religious orientation, class and the military play an important part in the creation of informal organizations. But now scholars and policymakers are able to think about the problems of difference because constructivism can replace the pervasive primordialism that characterizes discussions of identity. The key point of constructivist research is to offer an explanation for the origins of interests and the conditions under which interest transforms (Klotz and Lynch, 1998). With a better understanding of interests, we can then return to the issue of how actors get what they want.

Technology enabled trust communities that are interacting to become a base to grow a sense of belonging that is entailed in the membership component of citizenship. However, crony capitalism and blatant conflict of interests in the form of corrupt patronage are the factors that can weaken "official nationalism (Anderson, 1983)," thus providing the impetus to forge the formation of trust community that can create social capital.

In today's information age the local and the global become more intensely and visibly connected. In Indonesia for instance, the Islamic radical groups that exist began to develop links with similar Islamic movements in other parts of the world, and they use the Internet to disseminate anti-American messages. Hence, the Internet played a role as an identity tool for collective action that communicated the global citizenship of radical fundamentalists (Lim, 2005).

The preferences for online activities are shifting; social media is gaining ground due to the popularity of Facebook and Twitter. As Internet penetration in Indonesian homes is relatively low, mobile phones are the second

most popular mode used to access the Internet, having increased 26% from 2009 to 2010. This growth trend in mobile ownership is likely continue, with the total mobile subscriber base surpassing 150 million by January 2010, it was forecasted to hit 246.1 million at the end of 2011, a penetration rate of 97.8% and Indonesia is the world's 4th largest mobile market behind China, India, and the United States in 2011 (Lim, 2005). Internet users reached an astounding number: 55,000,000, and Facebook users 51,096,860 and by the end of 2012 mobile penetration reached 89 per cent, Twitter users 130,943,101 which made Indonesia as 5th ranked among 20 countries. According to Nielsen in 2017 the Internet is now on 3rd position among all media with 44% reach or equivalent with 24.2 million people (Nielsen, 2017).

Facebook is experiencing a surge in popularity among Indonesian users, driven by the spread of mobile devices. Indonesians engage in a variety of activities with Facebook, connecting with friends and sharing information online, and adopting the social media to become a powerful advocacy tool. In addition to (re)shaping public opinion or discourse, what is commonly occurring is using social media to support the formation of a campaign. One of the most famous is the campaign *Coins for Prita*, which became a nationwide movement in 2009. Prita Mulyasari, a housewife, was being prosecuted under the charge of defamation for uttering complaints through private e-mails to family and friends regarding the service of the Omni International Hospital where she was treated (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012).

She was jailed for three weeks and was released after a public outcry, which gained traction after becoming viral on the Net thanks to Facebook (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). Prita was sued in a civil case by the Hospital and fined Rp.312 million (US\$37,000), she appealed and managed to get the fine cut to Rp.204 million (US\$20,500) before appealing to the Supreme Court. It was during this appeal

the Indonesian net activists started a mailing list and Facebook group called *Coins for Prita* to raise money from people all over the country to help Prita pay. Seeing such huge support for Prita, the Hospital dropped the civil lawsuit and the Supreme Court quashed it altogether (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012).

In a similar case, Facebook has also become a powerful advocacy tool channeling public anger over the arrest of two anti-graft commission members in November 2009. More than a million people joined the “Movement of 1,000,000 Facebookers Supporting Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Riyanto” in protest (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). In addition to influencing public opinion, the supporters also used the technology to invite people to rally in Jakarta. The rally was to support the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission). The rally, on September 10, 2009, was attended by five thousand people. Another prominent example of social media facilitating Indonesian social movements is *Coin A Chance*. *Coin A Change* is a charitable social movement initiated in Jakarta in 2008 which aims to provide the chance of an education for impoverished children by asking people to collect or donate their coins or change (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). Another movement, *1,000 Books Movement* uses social media to collect used books for children living in poverty or in deprived rural areas (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). In addition to Facebook and Twitter, blogs remain popular. Almost every big city in Indonesia has its own blogger community. These blogger communities commonly organize gatherings (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). In politics, social media has started to become an important aspect in Indonesian political campaigns, but instead of initiating a thorough political conversation with their potential voters, these candidates mostly post their programs’ campaign schedules, or other related articles in their social media accounts (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). The potential of the new media as political marketing tools to youngsters is being wasted.

Such are the dynamics in Indonesia that substantiate the assumptions that there are also non-technological factors that can potentially drive or inhibit the proliferation of social media in civic movement and in political processes (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012).

The movement of *#IndonesiaTanpaFPI* is an example of strategic activism. Starting from a debate in the Twittersphere initiated by @IndTanpaFPI the movement has evolved toward offline engagement by organizing a rally then gathering support to officially sue the Indonesian Police Force for being unable to prevent violence in the name of religion (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). This is a rare example where activism online can generate a movement offline. There are certainly features of new media that pose challenges for civil society activism, where due to the combination of speed and the amount of information being received people lack a deep understanding of the stories, and therefore do not take informed action (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012). There needs to be a shift from (merely) knowing what is going on in the online world to (consciously) engaging in offline activism (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012).

Indonesian population pyramid at present comprises of the following age structure:

0-14 years: 25.42%;

15-24 years: 17.03%;

25-54 years: 42.35%;

55-64 years: 8.4%;

65 years and over: 6.79% (CIA, 2016)

The Yayasan Inadis did a research on the degree of satisfaction of the Millennial Generation:

Tabel 1.1 Degree of Satisfaction of Indonesian Millennials

Field	Positive Opinion (Satisfied)	Neutral Opinion	Negative Opinion (Not Satisfied)
Politics	2,56 %	38,46 %	58,97 %
Sports	37,03 %	33,33 %	29,62 %

Arts	25 %	50 %	25 %
Economics	37,93 %	34,48 %	27,58 %
Religion	20 %	2,5 %	77,5 %
Teknology	29,16 %	25 %	45,83 %
Automotive	21,42 %	21,42 %	57,14 %


Opini tentang Bidang Politik di Indonesia. Dalam bidang politik, pemuda Indonesia terlihat masih kurang begitu puas (58,97 %) terhadap situasi dan kondisi politik Indonesia di masa sekarang. Banyak dari mereka yang melihat bahwa saat ini politik di Indonesia belum baik, dan terdapat banyak permasalahan, karena terlalu banyak orang yang hanya mementingkan kekuasaannya semata. Beberapa dari mereka mengidolakan figur Ahok atau pasangan Ahok-Djarot, sebagian dari mereka ada yang mendukung figur Presiden Jokowi, serta ada juga yang menyukai figur Anies Baswedan atau pasangan Anies-Sandi. Beberapa pemuda-pemuda di atas kemudian berharap bahwa di kemudian hari politik Indonesia akan terus membaik, tidak berantakan, serta bersifat lebih toleran dan anti-SARA.

Opini tentang Bidang Ekonomi di Indonesia. Pendapat para pemuda Indonesia tentang bidang ekonomi kebanyakan berkuat pada opini cenderung membaiknya (37,93%) perekonomian Indonesia di masa sekarang. Hal tersebut mungkin saja terkait dengan figur ekonomi Indonesia yang banyak didukung oleh Generasi Millennial Indonesia ini, yaitu Sri Mulyani. Bagaimanapun juga, di saat yang bersamaan, banyak pula yang merasa masih tidak puas (27,58 %) dengan perekonomian Indonesia, sehubungan dengan biaya-biaya yang semakin mahal untuk kebutuhan sehari-hari, pendidikan, transportasi, dan lain sebagainya.

Opini tentang Bidang Agama di Indonesia. Sebagian besar (77,5 %) pemuda di Indonesia beropini bahwa mereka masih kurang puas terhadap kehidupan keagamaan di

Indonesia. Mereka berpendapat bahwa sebaiknya agama dan politik di Indonesia tidaklah dicampuradukkan serta tidak digunakan sebagai alat politik oleh kelompok tertentu. Sebagian dari mereka ada yang menyatakan bahwa agama merupakan hal yang penting untuk politik dan ekonomi serta untuk pedoman kehidupan secara umum, tapi ada juga yang tidak. Beberapa dari mereka menjelaskan bahwa agama sebenarnya urusan masing-masing (pribadi) dan tidaklah terkait langsung dengan politik dan ekonomi.

Opini tentang Bidang Teknologi di Indonesia. Satu bagian (45,83 %) dari Generasi illennial Indonesia menyatakan bahwa perkembangan teknologi di Indonesia masih belum memuaskan dan kalah dengan negara lain. Maka dari itu, mereka berpendapat bahwa untuk perkembangan teknologi di Indonesia secara lebih lanjut perlu dukungan dan bimbingan dari pemerintah.



The research used Google Form for planning, pre-testing, and online survey. The activities of the millennials then were able to be captured by observing the amount of writings done in portal blog or blog forum (Blogger, Wordpress, and *Kompasiana*). There are 27 articles that were relevant because it contains the minimal criteria to be contextually analyzed pertaining to their trait and concern. Their characteristics reflect a heightened sense of nationalism and an inclination to care. They are concerned about government and SARA issue. The want speed, openness and achievement.

During the survey in September 2017 involving 119 young people from the age of 18 years to 32 inside and outside Jabodetabek, 87% of the young people have heard about the U.S. Election. However, only 81% of them know how many political parties there are in the U.S. election. It was also discovered that only 56.6% of them knows that the president of the U.S. are elected based on an electoral college system, while some 38.1% thought it was done through a direct voting system. Only 37.2% of them know how many votes a candidate needs to win the Electoral College. 36% believes the president has a five year term instead of four. It means only half the millennials in Indonesia understand the U.S. election and may simultaneously not realizing that the U.S. election may have some effects in the domestic Indonesian politics. 66% of the Indonesian millennials believe that there was fraud in the U.S. election. It may also means that many young people think the federal election committee hasn't been successful in preventing fraud that may affect the legitimacy of the election results. We tried to simplify the type of election frauds into three groups: voter suppressions, black campaign, and money politics. By voter suppression we mean any activities that have a purpose of intimidating voters or deliberately diminishing or eliminating the people's rights to vote. Meanwhile black campaign is any activity that has a purpose of defaming the candidate with negative or false information. Money politics is an activity to use money/resources for political gain such as bribery, giveaway, trading positions.

About 72% of the respondents said they know what voter suppression means. They cited some examples such as lost ballots, racial intimidation, violent demonstration. 82% thought Trump as a leading figure of voter suppression.

Most millennials know about black campaign. The mentioned as examples, spreading fake news, baseless accusation, name calling. 86% said President Trump was a

candidate who was engaging in black campaign.

Money politics is considered as the worse fraud for the Indonesian millennials. 6.5% claimed they know of the nature of money politics such as campaign contribution, governmental position offer, bribery, and gratification. 85% thought President Trump had violated these type of election fraud.

To the following question, among the three types of frauds, what are the likelihood that they will occur in the United States: 1) Black campaign 57%; 2) Voter suppression 24%; 3) Money politics 19%

Conclusion

Indonesians with the encouragement of its state and extra state leaders can begin to concentrate a specific cooperative effort when mutual interests can emerge and continue to evolve in specific functional issues. With one caveat as described by Manuel Castells that the spirit of informationalism is in reality the culture of creative destruction. But as he knows so well, this is the anti-culture that he is talking about, the anti-spirit that kills rather than enlivens subject capable of constructing and maintaining a new socio-economic paradigm. With information as the lifeblood and speed as the killer variable of networks, getting inside the decision making as well as the image making loop of the people becomes important.

Communication happens by activating minds to share meanings. The mind is a process of creation and manipulation of mental images (visual or not) in the brain. Ideas can be seen as arrangements of mental images. In all probability, mental images correspond to neural patterns. Neural patterns are arrangements of activity in neural networks. Neural networks connect neurons, which are nerve cells Castells, 2009).

The experience of Indonesia in the age of information led Yanuar Nugroho and Sofie Shinta Syarief to conclude that (Nugroho and Syarief, 2012): first, what matters in civil society activism are not tools such as the

Internet or the social media per se, but how civil society strategically and politically uses the media to advance their activism. Very rarely do social media work in isolation from other media when it comes to recruitment and mobilization. Second, as change always takes place in the real offline sphere, the role of physical technology is in fact secondary to the social one (engagements, meetings, direct exchanges). Third, focusing the analysis only on the technical aspect of the Internet and social media's facilitators of civil society movements is naïve. Fourth, if new media can strategically be used in civil society, there is a good possibility for concerned groups to contribute to the shaping of relations between technology, politics, and civic engagements. Fifth, we should be more critical towards cyber-utopianism or 'Internet-centricity.' Finally, civic activism is more than click-activism.

With regard to Indonesia we must constantly keep some important historical facts in mind because Indonesia belies its stereotypic status as a "pacific" nation both socially and demographically (Demerath, 2001). In Indonesia, by the year 2020 the population pyramid will comprise of a majority of the Indonesian young generation. This demographic bonus constitutes an as either an important boost or turns out to be a constraint to the Indonesian economy. From a survey of Indonesian youths (the millennials comprise of those born between 1994-1997; or 34% and 25% from the total female and male respondents respectively) done by the researchers at Yayasan INADIS (Indonesian Institute of Advanced International Studies) it was clear that they are tech savvy and known as digital natives. They are evidently creative, and have a strong tendency to always closely gather with their peers. The research also indicated the distribution of news that they are excited about: issues pertaining to economics (18%); politics (17%), education (16%), religion (13%), and science and technology (12%).

From the Yayasan INADIS data analysis and research result it is clear that a large number of these Indonesian youths are inclined to spend their leisure time by doing things that pertain to what they really feel very passionate about. The research report further indicated that these youths tend to perceive highly negatively the following issues: politics (58,97%); technology (45%); and religion (77,5%). Based on the survey result a large number of the respondents seems to have been affected by popular issues that prevail in the public sphere, particularly due to their exposure to social media. If they are not sufficiently curious these sort of news feed may distort their knowledge of the issue being discussed. It seems evident that majority of the respondents seem disinterested about issues that suddenly became salient at a particular moment and time. They are merely acting as consumers of the news feed without spending any extra time to research or even personally conscious about and then attempted to find other sources of information regarding the issue.

These Indonesian youths are active and productive writers of blogs the research of Yayasan INADIS collected samples of their writings and found that the articles tend to be directed at a range of leadership issues and social relations among millennials generation.

Data analysis seems to point to two elements: that of the millennials' traits and concerns. Traits comprise of the characteristic tendency of the millennials generation that we can predict from their choice of words that have certain meanings. The millennials concerns pertain to what their writings indicate specifically. Their dominant traits are: nationalistic and caring. Their concerns are directed to issues of SARA (ethnicity, religion, and race), government and transparency.

During the survey of the U.S. Election, when they were asked to look at Indonesia, 87% of the Indonesian millennials said they know there are frauds in the Indonesian election. 48% of them said money politics was common place, this then was followed by black

campaigns 39%, and voter suppressions 8%. What do these numbers 48% and 39% mean? It means 89% of the young people have acknowledged that there are election frauds. If these opinions persist, election frauds may become the new normal. What's dangerous about this new normal is that it threatens democracy.

Indonesians in reality could strive harder to prevent further upheaval as they so prize status etiquette (Demerath, 2001). And it is clear that only by way of forging trust communities in a variety of areas of interests Indonesians will come to value ends for which their cultural equipment is well suited. Through interactions among trust communities a sense of empathy evolves and the extension of the community members' sympathies to particular 'others' becomes particularly relevant. This will support the nation's effort at social inclusion as functionally relevant area of interest may evolve as social glue. This can generate a deeper sense of trust that goes a long way in creating social capital for leaders to be able to govern the nation.

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